This review documents how scholarly concern with democratic deficits in American constitutionalism has shifted from the courts to electoral institutions. Prominent political scientists are increasingly rejecting the countermajoritarian difficulty as the proper framework for studying and evaluating judicial power. Political scientists, who study Congress and the presidency, however, have recently emphasized countermajoritarian difficulties with electoral institutions, Realistic normative appraisals of American political institutions, this emerging literature on constitutional politics in the United States maintains, should begin by postulating a set of democratic and constitutional goods, determine the extent to which American institutions as a whole are delivering those goods, and either explain how the political system as a whole might be redesigned to better deliver those goods or accept second-best constitutional goods that can actually be delivered by some attainable combination of political institutions,
The countermajoritarian difficulty is emigrating from the judiciary to the elected branches of government. Alexander Bickel, the Yale Law professor who coined the phrase countermajoritarian difficulty, regarded judicial review as "a deviant institution in the American democracy" (Bickel 1962, p. 18) . Policy choices, he and other legal scholars of his generation proclaimed, were best made by elected officials who were politically accountable and more likely to reflect public sentiment than were unelected justices (see, e.g., Ely 1980). The titles of the books in the Institutions of American Democracy series sponsored by the Annenberg Foundation Trust challenge this consensus. Rosen's (2006) ship into virtually tribal politics," a "decline in accountability," "a decline in congressional deliberation and a de facto delegation of authority and influence to the president" (pp. x, 12). The result is a governing process that is not democratically sustainable. As Mann & Ornstein (2006, p. 13) conclude, the "country and its enduring constitutional pact should not, and cannot, endure a broken branch for long." This review documents how scholarly concern with democratic deficits in American constitutionalism has shifted from the courts to electoral institutions. The first section examines the increased tendency for political scientists to reject the countermajoritarian difficulty as the proper framework for studying and evaluating judicial power. Whittington (2007) in- 362 Graber sists that judicial supremacy is politically constructed by presidents who, more often than not, have reasons to empower courts as allies in their struggles against political rivals in the states, in Congress, and in their political party.
Frymer ( tives in a polarized polity are able to pass and maintain regulatory programs that lack broad popular support. Lee & Oppenheimer (1999) explain why equal state representation in the Senate promotes undemocratic public policies that substantially overvalue the interests and values of small-state citizens. Such contemporary constitutional critics as Dahl (2001) and Levinson (2006) spend far more energy criticizing the majoritarian failings of Article I, Article II, and Article V than the democratic problems with life-tenured justices armed with the power to declare laws unconstitutional.
All the works surveyed abandon the subtle formalism underlying Alexander Bickel's original formulation of the countermajoritarian problem. Bickel (1962) insisted that elected officials should make political decisions because elected officials were politically accountable. Procedurally fair elections, his work indicated, were both the necessary and sufficient condition for democratic legitimacy (Bickel 1962, p. 33) . Contemporary scholars of American politics recognize that political accountability is as determined by constitutional politics as constitutional forms. Works subtitled The Declining Importance of Elections (Ginsberg & Shefter 1990) detail how procedurally fair elections are often not sufficient to give citizens adequate control over policymaking. Elections do not promote accountability, Hacker & Pierson (2006, p. 217) explain, when voters are poorly informed or are not offered candidates committed to their values and interests. Litigation may promote accountability, Frymer (2007, p. 130) maintains, when courts provide de facto representation to political interests that elected officials have no incentive to accommodate.
This scholarship on the political foundations of judicial power, the baneful consequences of polarization on public policy, and the democratic deficits hard wired into the Constitution is generating a more systemic understanding of the counterrnajoritarian difficulty and constitutionalism in the United States. Commentators whose work was s ructured by Bickel's countermajoritarian problem isolated the Supreme Court from the rest of American politics, focused entirely on whether particular judicial decisions passed democratic muster, limited analysis to legal issues adjudicated by federal courts, and commented on only one dimension, majoritarianism, of democratic government. The works surveyed in this review observe that apparent democratic deficits in one institution may be consequences of democratic deficits in other institutions, explore how all American institutions respond to constitutional questions, elaborate how constitutional practices structure the ways political institutions make public policies, and suggest how judicial review may alleviate or aggravate coherence, polarization, bias, and accountability difficulties. Whittington, Frymer, Hacker & Pierson, Lee & Oppenheimer, and Levinson agree that the crucial constitutional question is whether the political system as a whole exhibits certain virtues, not whether a particular output or institution, standing alone, passes a particular democratic or constitutional standard. Realistic normative appraisals of American political institutions, this emerging literature on constitutional politics in the United States maintains, should begin by postulating a set of democratic and constitutional goods, determine the extent to which American institutions as a whole are delivering those goods, and either explain how the political system as a whole might be redesigned to better deliver those goods or accept second-best constitutional goods that can actually be delivered by some attainable combination of political institutions.
THE COUNTERMA]ORITARIAN DIFFICULTY REVILED
The contemporary countermajoritarian difficulty largely dates from the publication of Bickel's (1962 (Bickel 1962, p. 33) . Nevertheless, Bickel (1962, p. 18) insisted, judicial review was a "deviant institution in a democratic society."
The countermajoritarian problem, in his view (p. 33), was as much rooted in claims that policy ought to be controlled by elected officials as in claims that a majority of elected officials might not approve of judicial decisions.
Much political science wisdom for the past generation challenges the countermajoritarian perception of the relationship between justices and elected officials. The seminal works in this literature include Whittington (2007 Whittington ( ,2005 , Gillman (2006 Gillman ( , 2002 , Pickerill & Clayton (2004) , Clayton & May (1999 ), Lovell (2003 , Frymer (2003 Frymer ( , 2007 , McMahon (2004) , Hirschi (2004 ), Ginsburg (2003 , Sweet (2000) , Graber (1993 ), Lasser (1988 , and Dahl (1957) .
Several prominent law professors began working within and developing this new paradigm.
They include Powe (2000) , Balkin & Levinson (2001 ), Friedman (1993 , Griffin (1996) , Tushnet (2006 Tushnet ( ,2005 , and Klarman (2004) . Important forthcoming works include Silverstein (2009), Clayton & Pickerill (2009 ), Friedman (2009 ), and McMahon (2008 . Students of public law committed to regime politics theory www.ll111l11f1h-eviews.org
• The Countermajoritnrian Difficulty (Pickerill & Clayton 2004) or the political construction of judicial power (Whittington 2007) (Burgess 1992 , Curtis 2000 , Devins 1996 , Dinan 1998 , Fisher 1988 , Friedman 1993 , Levinson 1988 had detailed how other political actors often engaged in constitutional interpretation, sometimes challenging (Agresto 1984 , Kramer 2004 ) and sometimes buttressing (Graber 1993 , Lovell 2003 ) judicial authority. Friedman's (1998 Friedman's ( , 2000 Friedman's ( , 2001 Friedman's ( , 2002a At the very least, a majority in at least one elected branch of the national government has 368 Graber historically thought government by judiciary more attractive politically than presidential authority to determine constitutional meanings.
Reconstructive presidencies in their pure form may also be a relic of the American constitutional past. Skowronek (1993, p. 443 judicial-are fundamentally flawed in their ability to effectively represent the will of the public." Judicial policymaking in civil rights cases alleviated some of these democratic deficits.
Black and Blue
"Democratic equality will often necessitate action by those who are less directly representative to the public, " Frymer (2007, p. 130) declares, "because they have incentives to represent both minority and majority groups that are unable to represent themselves effectively." Frymer's primary concern might be labeled the coherence difficulty. The federal judiciary and the NLRB were entirely separate institutions whose decisions on labor relationships were not coordinated by any more central agency.
The consequence of this fragmentation was that judicial decisions promoting integration often undermined NLRB rulings thought vi- His examination of disputes that arose during labor elections finds that courts were more inclined to see any racist remark as raising questions about the legality of prounion campaigns, whereas administrative agencies were more concerned with the underlying racial politics. In sharp contrast to "federal court decisions under antidiscrimination law, " Frymer (2007, p. 110) writes, "racism in labor law is regulated for its potentially damaging political consequences, and not because it is considered reprehensible and unacceptable in any context."
Given the past history of discrimination in unions, that workers would make some racial appeals during union elections is hardly surprising or unhealthy (Frymer 2007, p. 119 (Frymer 2007, p. 4; Greenberg 1996) .
Coherence was a problem with numerous
New Deal and Great Society policies that farmed policymaking responsibilities out to separate institutions with different constituencies, whether or not courts were involved (Lowi 1969) . Frymer (2007, p. 14) endorse studies finding that "congressional voting and public policy are more responsive to the opinions of high-income citizens than poorer voters" (McCarty et al. 2006, p. 73 possessing the wherewithal to flood the media with their interpretation of political events, affluent conservatives consistently confuse the public about legislation that has actually been passed and executive policies that have been 2 Affluent Democrats seem more inclined to be social liberals than economic liberals. Thus, the Clinton administration promoted off-center policies on matters such as partial-term abortions, while adopting center, if not center-right, economic policies (Graber 1997, pp. 731-33) . Similarly, Republicans have not successfully implemented their social agenda because "[i]n contemporary politics, opposition to conservatives on cultural and social issues is intense, organized, and well heeled" (Hacker & Pierson 2006, p. 195) . Indeed, contemporary American politics might be characterized as structured by a conflict between affluent citizens who fight to the death for off-center economic policies, but cave on abortion, and other affluent citizens who fight to the death for offcenter abortion policies, bur cave on tax policies.
THE COUNTERMAjORITARIAN DIFFICULTY REVIVED
implemented. Off Center details how "[cJontrol of language and alternatives can be used to frame discussions in ways that exploit voters' 
The Countennajoritarian Difficulty with the Constitution
American electoral institutions also suffer from countermajoritarian difficulties that are constitutionally built into the polity. That the Constitution contains various majoritarian failings is hardly surprising. The persons responsible for the Constitution of 1787 were not unalloyed majoritarians, and they scorned democracy, at
Graber least what they referred to as democracy.' Constitutional institutions were designed to "break and control the violence of faction," which Madison believed could consist of "a majority or a minority of the whole" (Hamilton et al. 1961, pp. 77-78) . Still, that the framers were not majoritarian democrats is hardly a sufficient reason for more enlightened citizens to endorse countermajoritarian practices at present. Maintaining the Senate and the Electoral College seems particularly perverse. Dahl (2001, pp. 31, 49) , the preeminent democratic theorist in the United States, asserts that the "electoral college ... grossly violate(s) basic democratic principles" and that "the degree of (Dahl 2001, pp. 52-53; Lee & Oppenheimer 1999, pp. 20-22) . Lee & Oppenheimer (1999) "leaves no aspect of the institution untouched" (Lee & Oppenheimer 1999, pp. 224--25) .
Senators from small states have personal relationships with more of their constituents (p. 54), they are more likely to limit fundraising to persons interested in obtaining particularized benefits from the national government (p. 84), and they are more likely to secure particularized benefits for their constituents (p. 13). Equal representation determines how federal funds are distributed, which partisan coalitions control the Senate, and how much power those coalitions exercise.
Small-state senators are particularly adept at bringing home the bacon for their constituents.
Senators from low-population states almost always secure state minimums, typically 0.5% of the total funds allocated, whenever nondiscretionary federal spending programs are enacted (Lee & Oppenheimer 1999, p. 205) . Wyoming, for example, receives far greater funding per citizen than California for assistance to the blind, even though no evidence exists that a greater percentage of blind people reside in Wyoming or that blind people in Wyoming require more financial assistance. Small-state senators earn this bonanza for their constituents because senators with equal power naturally seek to secure equal benefits. "A 'fair' distribution in the Senate," Lee & Oppenheimer (1999, p. 163) detail, "is one that treats all senators 'equitably,' tending toward an equal allocation of funds across states." Senators from low-population states also have greater capacity to obtain additional funds for their constituents as the price for supporting legislation. Because they need fewer votes for reelection, relatively small amounts of spending can secure the vote of a small-state senator. As one commentator noted, "[T[he small states are cheap dates" (Lee & Oppenheimer 1999, p. 190) .
Equal state representation structures nonspending policy by influencing the representational experience of senators, their capacity for leadership, and the partisan balance in the upper chamber of the national legislature. Senators from low-population states are freer to champion controversial positions on more issues than their peers from more populous states, Lee & Oppenheimer (1999, p. 149) Levinson focuses his sharp gaze on such constitutionally mandated procedures as the presidential veto. These clauses, whose language is not subject to much interpretive flexibility, prevent popular majorities from passing legislation, vest too much power in a relatively irre- Studies of the countermajoritarian, coherence, polarization, accountability, and bias difficulties should be concerned with the performance of the constitutional system as a whole, abandoning an "institutional partisanship" that assumes "the centrality of the[ ] [particular] institution" being studied "in the drama of American politics" (Tulis 1987, pp. 9-10 Parenthood v. Casey (1992) . Casey presented greater accountability difficulties than Brown, given that Republican judicial appointees supported the constitutional right to abortion. The judicial decisions desegregating labor unions made civil rights lawmore coherent and labor law less coherent. Whether justices have a special capacity to "listen to voices from the margins" (Fiss 1989, p. 255) The author is not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
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